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INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, the world trading system has witnessed a sharp increase in the number of preferential trade agreements, leading to a phenomenon that is known as the "new regionalism".
1 Although the exact number of preferential trade agreements that currently exist is disputed, most observers agree that roughly 350 of them have been signed over the last half century. The importance of this development for participating as well as excluded countries has stimulated a substantial scholarly literature that explains the spread of agreements with reference to a large number of factors. Among them are the stagnation of the process of multilateral trade liberalization, the search for economies of scale, the desire to signal commitment to specific trade and economic policies, and the protection of foreign direct investments. Some agreements are also seen to have been driven by the geopolitical interests of the participating countries.
We offer an explanation for the new regionalism that sees preferential trade agreements mainly as response to the preferential trade policies of other countries. In this view, countries excluded from an agreement try to avoid the negative consequences of trade diversion by signing new agreements. 2 The specific argument that we propose, which we label the protection-for-exporters argument, builds on the assumption that exporters lobby more against certain losses of foreign market access than in favour of potential opportunities. 3 Given this differential propensity to lobby, discrimination abroad is expected to lead to a shift in the balance between exporters and import-competitors in a country. A shift in the balance between these two interests, in turn, brings about changes in the trade policies pursued, that is, governments are now expected to implement trade policies to protect exporter interests. One way of doing so is to sign preferential trade agreements with countries that already form part of such agreements.
We test the protection-for-exporters argument against alternative explanations in a quantitative analysis of the proliferation of preferential trade agreements among 167 countries between 1990 and 2007. In carrying out this analysis, we introduce several improvements with respect to data and method to the quantitative literature on preferential trade agreements. For one, we have designed a test of the protection-forexporters argument that captures the causal logic of countries responding to trade diversion as directly as possible. Second, we have established a new list of trade agreements, which represents an improvement on the datasets used in previous studies in terms of completeness and inclusion of recent agreements (up to and including 2007) .
Finally, we have exercised particular caution in controlling for alternative explanations to avoid overestimating the explanatory power of our own argument. The findings provide strong support for our argument. The choice by different countries to enter preferential 3 For this term, see Andreas Dür, Protection for Exporters: Discrimination and Liberalization in Transatlantic Trade Relations, 1930 -2010 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010 .
Our paper also is of relevance for broader debates about the governance of international economic relations. In fact, preferential trade agreements are far more than agreements that regulate trade in goods. Many of the more recent agreements encompass hundreds of pages of detailed rules on a variety of topics such as intellectual property rights, investments and standard setting. That such far-reaching agreements are often signed in reaction to the agreements concluded by other countries is a significant finding.
It shows that governments tie their hands on a large number of topics because the country's dependence on foreign markets compels them do so. Our assessment of the new regionalism hence is far less benign than the one reached by scholars in the neoliberal institutionalist tradition that see the spread of trade agreements as an expression of functional international cooperation.
THE PROTECTION-FOR-EXPORTERS ARGUMENT
Over the last twenty years, the number of dyads forming part of a preferential trade agreement has increased sharply (see Figure 1 ). While in 1990 only 244 pairs of countries had a preferential trade agreement between them, the number stood at 2160 in 2007. Below we provide a detailed explanation of how we arrive at these numbers. 9 Since some countries, for example states in the area of the former Soviet Union, enter the dataset later than 1990, the number of dyads varies between 10,296 and 13,861.
Customs Union agreement signed in 2006) agreements. Among the plurilateral agreements, we coded 40 agreements between a regional trading entity and an individual country. These are agreements signed by trading entities such as the Caribbean Community, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the EU, and Mercosur with third countries. Finally, we coded accessions by countries to existing agreements such as the EU, the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Central European
Free Trade Agreement.
FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Owing to its large number of member countries and agreements concluded with third countries (we have 23 such agreements in the database, some of which have been superseded by accession agreements), the European Union (EU) accounts for a sizeable number of the dyads with trade agreements. While the EU's increasing membership and continued attractiveness as partner for preferential trade agreements is itself support for our argument, the process that we aim to explain is not limited to the EU. Our data show that across the world, the number of agreements being signed has increased over the last two decades. In particular, a growing number of South-South agreements and agreements involving Asian countries have come into existence over the last few years.
What explains this proliferation of preferential trade agreements across the world?
The protection-for-exporters argument that we set out to respond to this question builds on a series of studies on the external effects of preferential trade agreements. competitors from continued protection of their sector against foreign competition. While potentially both trade policy constituencies can engage in lobbying, asking politicians to consider their interests when implementing trade policies, we assume that exporters often fail to become politically active. Exporters are likely to face uncertainty with respect to the potential benefits from engaging in lobbying for better foreign market access because they tend to not only have little information about, but also underestimate the potential opportunities they may be missing in a foreign market. 12 Moreover, even if they are aware of a missed opportunity, they face uncertainty about the willingness of a foreign government to reduce its trade barriers in exchange for concessions. 13 The uncertainty is even further enhanced by the fact that trade negotiations tend to take place over a substantial period of time, making it difficult to know the competitive situation of an exporter at the time the agreement enters into effect. As a result, for an exporter it is difficult to predict whether she or rather another exporter from the same country will reap the potential benefits of better foreign market access. In the case of plurilateral or multilateral agreements, the benefits of trade liberalization may even go to an exporter from another country. 14 In short, it can be expected that uncertainty inhibits exporters' 12 T.N. Srinivasan and Jagdish Bhagwati "Outward-Orientation 13 There is also the uncertainty of whether they will be able to convince their own government to pursue their preferences, but this uncertainty is shared by import-competitors.
14 Judith Goldstein and Lisa Martin "Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note", International Organization 54(3) (2000), 603-32, pp. 607-08. lobbying for gains. Only few exporters will manage to become politically active, ensuring that the balance of domestic interests is biased in favour of import-competing interests.
Exporters' incentives to mobilize are substantially different when facing losses, caused, for example, by the creation of a preferential trading arrangement among foreign countries that leads to trade diversion. 15 In this situation, rather than having to invest in monitoring foreign markets to gather information about export opportunities, they can simply react in a fire-brigade manner to any losses they experience from the trade policy choices of foreign countries. Moreover, they can be quite certain about the consequences of their lobbying activity. If they manage to achieve the re-establishment of the market conditions that existed before the creation of the preferential trade agreement, they should be able to regain their share of that market. Exporters' uncertainty of lobbying against losses, consequently, should be lower than the uncertainty of lobbying for gains. The expectation derived from this reasoning, then, is that a stronger lobby effort by exporters should be visible in response to losses than in pursuit of potential gains. Hypothesis: The more discrimination that countries A and B face in each other's markets, the higher the probability of a preferential trade agreement between them.
Any explanation relying on such a snowball or domino effect begs the question of why the initial event comes about, in this case, why the initial agreement was signed. In line with the protection-for-exporters argument, we suggest that in some cases governments may be able to design an agreement that imposes costs on third countries rather than domestic import-competing interests. 21 In such a case, in the absence of opposition from import-competitors, governments may find it beneficial to conclude an
agreement. An initial agreement may also come about between adjacent countries, since here exporters' uncertainty about the potential benefits of trade liberalization is likely to be at its most minimal. For some of the initial agreements, an explanation may also require consideration of factors exogenous to the argument, such as the geopolitical interests of countries.
Countries could also be expected to conclude preferential trade agreements in a pro-active manner because they expect to benefit from the external effect that we describe here. In fact, there are some historical examples of countries using preferential trade agreements to put pressure on third countries. Some evidence suggests that the U.S. empirical record, however, suggests that in most cases decision-makers do not anticipate the external consequences of a preferential trade agreement. In some cases, they even were surprised by these effects. Few observers, for example, predicted that the deepening of European integration in the 1980s would have a pull effect on third countries.
23
Although we have formulated our argument using the example of bilateral agreements, the logic also applies to plurilateral preferential agreements. For exporters in third countries, the effects of plurilateral and bilateral agreements are similar, with the only major difference being that a plurilateral agreement threatens access to several markets at the same time. The larger the pull effect of an agreement between countries A, B, C, and D on excluded country E, the larger the number of markets in which E faces discrimination. The precise reaction of country E to this plurilateral agreement will depend on its export interests. If it only faces discrimination in one country, it will conclude a bilateral agreement with that country. 24 If it faces discrimination in more than one market, however, it may decide to join the existing agreement.
In solely concentrating on the probability of a negotiated agreement between an excluded and a member country, we ignore three alternative courses of action that an aggrieved country could pursue. sign an agreement with the U.S. also supports our logic, as the EU's exports to the U.S.
do not compete with those from Mexico. To capture this effect, we disaggregated trade flows to the sector level and then assessed whether countries export the same basket of goods.
36
In form of a formula, the spatial weight for the undirected dyad AB is:
where AB k and BA k are the competitive distances for the two directed dyads. PTA is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country A (B) signed an agreement with countries C, D, and so on between one and five years ago. The competitive distances are zero if there is no connection between countries A and B. Equation (3) shows that we 36 We used data from the World Banks's World Development Indicators database, which allows disaggregating exports by 12 sectors (agricultural raw materials, arms, communications equipment, food, fuel, high-technology goods, insurance and financial services, international tourism, ores and metals, other commercial services, transport services, and travel services). We then correlated the export mix of all countries, which allowed us to arrive at an index of export similarity. (1992) should have increased the pressure on Chile to sign an agreement with the U.S. In fact,
shortly after the conclusion of NAFTA, there was talk of Chile becoming a member of that agreement. 39 At that time, however, the U.S. felt hardly any pressure to sign an agreement with Chile. The agreements between a series of Latin American countries (among them Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela in 1993) and Chile only had a small impact on the U.S., because these countries exported little to Chile and because their exports did not compete with those from the U.S. in the Chilean market. Our counterfactual expectation is that if Chile had signed a trade agreement with a direct competitor 38 We use the natural logarithm of this variable as it is characterized by occasional large observations. 
FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE

Alternative Diffusion Mechanisms
Besides reaction to trade diversion, several alternative causal mechanisms could drive the diffusion of trade agreements. In the empirical analysis below, we control for the possibility that diffusion is a result of either emulation or security externalities. 
Control Variables
We also control for a series of characteristics of the dyad under analysis that could influence the probability of two countries signing an agreement and the context in which a dyad considers concluding an agreement. Doing so is vital to avoid overestimating the effect of the spatial lags, as parallel policy choices may be a result not only of spatial interdependence, but also of correlated unit-level factors or exogenous shocks that are common to various dyads. 46 In line with previous studies in the field, we hence include several economic, geographical, and political control variables in our model. Most of these variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity problems.
47
Concerning the variables capturing the economic condition at the time when a pair of countries considers signing an agreement, we first control for the amount of trade between them (TRADE). An increase in trade may boost the probability of two countries forming a preferential trade agreement because large trade flows are likely to be accompanied by investments that are relation-specific, making traders dependent on access to each other's markets. These traders then may ask for a preferential trade agreement to lock in the existing situation and forestall protectionist trade policies by 46 Franzese and Hays, "Spatial Analysis".
47 Univariate summary statistics and data sources for all of these variables are available in the Appendix.
either side. 48 Trade may also matter as the positive welfare effects of a preferential trade agreement should be larger for country pairs with large trade flows before conclusion of the agreement.
49
We also take into account the size of the economy of the two countries to capture the idea that the larger the countries participating in a preferential trade agreement, the larger the economic gains. As Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand argue, a preferential agreement between two large economies increases the volume of trade in more varieties than one between two small economies. 50 In addition, the more sizeable increase in trade among two large countries causes a larger net expansion of demand and hence a larger rise in real income. We capture this idea by including the GDP of the smaller of the two countries in a dyad (GDP). A further economic factor that potentially influences the likelihood of an agreement between a pair of countries is their level of development. The more developed the two countries, the easier they should find it to conclude an agreement. Two reasons support this expectation. First, a country with a highly developed economy is less dependent on tariff revenues. Second, a developed country is in a better position to compensate societal groups that face adjustment costs arising from trade liberalization. 51 The variable that captures this argument is the GDP per capita of the less developed of the two countries (GDP PER CAPITA).
Two control variables capture domestic and international political conditions. At the international level, the expectation is for military allies to be more likely to sign an agreement than other pairs of countries (ALLIANCE). At the domestic level, previous research has shown that democratic pairs of countries tend to sign more preferential trade agreements than non-democratic or mixed pairs. 52 We use the seven point Freedom
House scale of democracy to measure this variable. 53 The advantage of the Freedom
House index over others is that it covers all of the countries in our dataset and the full time period. 54 We invert the values provided by Freedom House so that 1 is the value for a completely oppressive regime and 7 the value for a completely free regime (DEMOCRACY).
Moreover, we include three variables that capture the geographic position of the two countries. For one, since trade costs increase with distance, geographically closer countries are more likely to form a preferential trade agreement. 55 We thus incorporate the (natural logarithm of the) distance in kilometres between the two capitals of the pair of countries in our model (DISTANCE). In addition, neighbouring countries can be expected to have a higher probability of signing an agreement. Not only are there on average closer economic links between adjacent countries, but also the political links tend to be stronger. Following this reasoning, we expect countries that share a common border to be more likely to sign an agreement (CONTIGUITY). Finally, we control for whether at least one of the two countries is an island, as the specific geographical circumstances of such countries may influence their likelihood of signing an agreement (ISLAND). Furthermore, we use three proxies to capture the cultural distance between the two countries, as culturally similar countries may find it easier to negotiate an international agreement. These proxies are common principal language, same religion, and common colonial heritage (LANGUAGE, RELIGION, and COLONY). Finally, we include the (natural log of the) sum of the number of agreements signed by the two countries prior to time t to control for potential endogeneity resulting from the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in our model.
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FINDINGS
We use survival analysis, and more concretely a Cox proportional hazards model with standard errors adjusted for clustering on dyads, to examine our argument. 58 The advantage of using the Cox model, among the various survival models on offer, is that it does not require us to make assumptions about the shape of the underlying survival , 1998 -2006 ", International Studies Quarterly (2010 , who uses network analysis. distribution. 59 As described above, our model includes a spatial lag to capture the external competitive effect of the decision by two countries to sign an agreement, several alternative spatial lags, and control variables for both the dyad under consideration and potential external shocks. 60 We thus estimate the following equation:
h ij,t = h 0 (ij,t)exp[β 1 w ij,t-1 y ij,t* + β 2 x ij,t-1 + ε ij,t ]
where h ijt is the hazard rate for two countries i and j at time t, h 0 is the baseline hazard, β 1 and β 2 are vectors of coefficients, x ij,t-1 is a vector of control variables that are lagged by a year, and w ij,t-1 y ij,t* is a vector of spatial lag terms that are temporally lagged as described above. As is common practice in recent research on the statistical analysis of panel data with a binary dependent variable, we base significance tests on Huber (robust) standard errors. 61 These standard errors can take account of possible heteroskedasticity (serial correlation) or intra-group correlation of the data.
The findings are very supportive of our argument (see Model 1 in Table 1 Democracy, moreover, is statistically significant, which is in line with previous research.
As the original study on the role of democracy in the conclusion of trade agreements only had data up until 1992, whereas our database covers agreements until 2007, our findings provide important support for this earlier study. 62 The finding that distance reduces the 62 Mansfield et al., "Why Democracies Cooperate More".
likelihood of an agreement between two countries is intuitive. The same applies to the result that country pairs of which at least one is an island are less likely to conclude an agreement. By contrast, the strongly statistically significant negative sign of the estimated coefficient for contiguity is somewhat surprising. A potential explanation for this result is that contiguity does not add anything to the likelihood of two countries signing an agreement that is not already captured by distance, trade flows, and often similar culture of neighbouring countries. Moreover, two of the three variables capturing the cultural distance between two countries are statistically significant, with the unexpected finding that a common language reduces the likelihood of an agreement. Finally, the temporal lag variable that controls for potential endogeneity is also statistically significant. 63 In fact, when distance is excluded from the model, contiguity is positive and highly statistically significant. 64 Mansfield and Reinhardt, "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism".
Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the magnitude of the effects that we estimate. 65 Figure   3a shows the effect of an increase in the value of the trade and competition variable from the 5 th to the 95 th percentile. At the 5 th percentile level, a dyad's survival rate only falls from 1 to 0.92 over the 18 year period. At the 95 th percentile level, by contrast, the drop is from 1 to 0.45. This sizeable difference is an indication of the strength of the effect that we find. Figure 3b plots the substantive effect of the language spatial variable. Contrary to the effect of the competition measure, this one is very weak, with the survival probability falling from 1 to 0.87 for the country pair for which this variable takes the 95 th percentile value.
FIGURES 3a and b APPROXIMATELY HERE
A comparison of the predicted probabilities of a dyad signing an agreement for low and high values on the trade and competition variable provides a further illustration of the size of the effect of this variable. Taking the mean predicted probability for all dyads with a value larger than zero on the trade and competition variable, the overall prediction is for 86 dyads forming a preferential trade agreement each year. By contrast, when using the mean predicted probability for those dyads with a zero value on the trade and competition variable, only 49 dyads are expected to sign an agreement each year. The expected number of preferential agreements thus nearly doubles for dyads that face at 65 These graphs are drawn after rescaling the distance, GDP, and GDP per capita variables so that they have a mean of 0.
least some trade diversion as a result of preferential trade agreements between other countries.
Robustness Checks
We undertook a series of tests to examine the robustness of these results to changes in operationalization. 66 First, we estimated models in which we assume that preferential trade agreements have an impact on third countries for, respectively, between one and three (Model 2 in Table 1 ) and between one and seven years (Model 3) after their signature. These changes control for the robustness of our initial hunch of a five-year effect. In the three-year model, the coefficient is statistically significant and very similar in size to the one estimated for the five-year model. In the seven-year model, the coefficient is smaller and only weakly statistically significant (p=0.06). Since the coefficient is highly statistically significant in a six-year model (results not shown), our expectation that preferential trade agreements have a pull effect on third countries for some time, with this effect declining after about five years, is borne out by the empirical analysis. The findings from these models also reveal that endogeneity is not a major problem for our analysis. If endogeneity was driving our results, the coefficient should be larger, the longer the time period included in the spatial lag variable. A further important result of these models is that the estimated coefficients for all other variables are not affected by these changes in our independent variable of interest. The model thus is highly robust.
Second, following the suggestion of Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer we include year controls in the model, which did not change our findings (Model 4 in Table   66 All of the results that are not listed in Table 1 are available upon request from the corresponding author.
1). 67 The coefficient on the trade and competition variable barely changes (2.10 instead of 2.14). Interestingly, the spatial language variable is no longer statistically significant in this model. By contrast, several of the year controls turn out to be statistically significant.
Third, we made sure that our results are not influenced by the decision to log the spatial variables (Model 5 in Table 1 ). Again, the main results reported in Model 1 are not affected by this change. The only change that stands out is that the coefficient for the spatial effect of having the same religion becomes statistically significant but with a negative sign. Finally, we omitted the three variables capturing cultural distance between two countries (language, religion, and colony) to check whether this influences the findings for the alternative diffusion mechanisms (results now shown). Even in this model, however, the spatial lag capturing diffusion via a common language is the only of the alternative diffusion mechanisms with a statistically significant effect on the signing of new preferential trade agreements.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that exporters increase their level of political activity in response to trade diversion resulting from the creation of preferential trade agreements from which they are excluded. The mobilization of exporters, in turn, brings about a change in the balance of domestic interests that encourages the government to pursue a preferential trade agreement with the country in which exporters face discrimination. The new regionalism, in this reading, can be seen as a process driven by countries responding to trade diversion. The paper has broader implications for the study of International Relations and International Political Economy. It presents a causal mechanism that explains how the policies of one country can influence the balance of domestic interests in another country.
An analogous effect could be hypothesized to be at work whenever the policies of a group of countries have negative externalities for an excluded country. More specifically, cooperation between two or among a few countries that discriminates against third countries should have a pull-effect that is comparable to that captured in this paper for the case of preferential trade agreements. The European Higher Education Area, which aims at making European higher education more attractive, provides an illustration of this point. In this case, a cooperation effort that started with four countries in 1998 has grown to encompass no fewer than 47 members in 2010. One reason for the pull effect may be that the cooperation made some university systems more attractive for international students than others. Also outside of the trade realm, the spread of international agreements thus may be driven by a similar logic to the one espoused here. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
